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1. INTRODUCTION
How effectively one can accomplish persuasion has been of interest to ancient Greek philoso-
phers in the Lyceum of Athens,1 to early–modern English preachers in St Paul’s Cathedral,2 and
to contemporary American news producers at Fox News in New York City.3 Recently economists
have been endeavoring to build theoretical models of persuasion (e.g. Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011; Che, Dessein, and Kartik, 2013; Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2017; Bergemann and Morris, 2017;
Prat, 2018) and to quantify empirically to what extent persuasive effort affects the behavior of con-
sumers, voters, donors, and investors (see DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010, for a survey of the
recent literature).
In this paper, we set up an econometric model of persuasion, point out the key parameters of
interest, and study their identification under various scenarios of data availability. Since we have
observational data in mind, it is important that we allow for endogeneity, i.e. the possibility that an
agent’s decision on an exposure to persuasive information is correlated with her potential actions.
To convey the idea, we use DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007, DK hereafter) as a running example. DK
study the effect of an exposure to Fox News on the probability of voting for a Republican presi-
dential candidate. Here, the persuasive information of interest is the viewership of the Fox News
channel, where an agent’s decision about whether to watch Fox News or not may be correlated
with her political orientation. To address this issue, we assume that the econometrician has an
instrumental variable at his disposal: in DK’s study, they rely on the premise that Fox News avail-
ability via local cable in 2000 seems random after controlling for a set of covariates. Later we will
discuss this example again within the potential outcome framework.
Before introducing the key parameter in the paper, we recall the persuasion rate used in DK,
DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) and many others: for a binary outcome, it is defined by
f =
yT − yC
eT − eC ·
1
1− y0 ,
where yj is the share of group j adopting the behavior of interest (e.g. voting for a Republican can-
didate), ej is the share of group j exposed to persuasion, j ∈ {T, C}, and T and C denote treatment
and control groups (e.g. having Fox News available via local cable or not), respectively. Here, y0 is
1See Rapp (2010) for three technical means of persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.
2See Kirby (2008) for historic details of the public persuasion at Paul’s Cross, the open-air pulpit in St Paul’s Cathedral in
the 16th century.
3DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) and Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) measure the persuasive effects of slanted news using data
on Fox News.
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the share of the population that would take the action of interest without an exposure to persua-
sion. If y0 is unobserved, DK propose using yC in its place as an approximation. The quantity f
is intended to make it easier to compare persuasive effects across different studies. Since DK first
introduced the concept of the persuasion rate, it has been used and modified by many authors: e.g.
Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011); Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2011); DellaVi-
gna, Enikolopov, Mironova, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2014); Martin and Yurukoglu (2017); Bassi
and Rasul (2017). In their survey, DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) use the persuasion rate as the
key summary statistic to compare persuasive impacts across different studies.
In order to make our discussion more formal, we use the potential outcome framework. Let Ti
denote the binary indicator that equals 1 if individual i is exposed to persuasive information such
as Fox News. Let Yi(t) be a binary indicator, which shows agent i’s action when Ti is exogenously
set to t ∈ {0, 1}: in section 2 we model Yi(t) as an expected–utility–maximizing action with or
without an exposure to persuasion. For example, Yi(1) equals 1 if individual i votes for a Repub-
lican candidate when she watched Fox News. The econometrician never observes both Yi(0) and
Yi(1) but can only observe either of the two, i.e. Yi = TiYi(1) + (1− Ti)Yi(0). Then, the fraction of
individuals among the entire population who changed their behavior because of their exposure to
persuasive information can be denoted by
θ = P{Yi(1) = 1|Yi(0) = 0}. (1)
Here, the conditioning event Yi(0) = 0 describes the counterfactual instance that individual i would
not vote for a Republican candidate if she was excluded from the viewership of Fox News. If
Yi(0) = 1, then there is no room for persuasion for individual i. In section 5.1, we point out that
θ generally differs from the probability limit of f : heterogeneity in the effect of persuasion is an
important reason for the discrepancy.
It is a challenging task to identify θ since (i) we never observe Yi(1) and Yi(0) jointly, (ii) Ti
may not be observed at all, and (iii) Ti can be highly endogenous. As we mentioned earlier, DK
use entries of the Fox News cable channel to local markets as a natural experiment, which helps
to address issue (iii). Like DK, a large body of the empirical literature on measuring the effect of
persuasion makes use of data from natural or field experiments (e.g. DellaVigna and Gentzkow,
2010), where “intent–to–treat” is randomized by design. In our identification analysis, we presume
that by the design of an empirical study, there exists an instrumental variable Zi that is independent
of unobservables but affects Ti. Note, however, that even in an experimental setup, where Zi is
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initially randomized, it is rare that the agent’s actual exposure Ti to the treatment is randomly
determined. Individuals can choose to watch Fox News, whereas the Fox News channel may be
randomly available in the local cable package. Also, we note that “intent–to–treat” is easier to
observe than the “actual” treatment.
We build on the econometrics literature on partial identification (e.g. Manski, 2003, 2007; Tamer,
2010) and the literature on program evaluation (see e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007; Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2009, for surveys of the literature). Our work is the first paper that formulates quan-
tification of the effect of persuasion within the framework of causal inference and provides a formal
identification analysis. We are explicit about the possibility that an actual exposure to persuasion
can be endogenous and its effect can be heterogeneous. At this level of generality, the commonly
used quantity f , or its approximation, is different from θ. As a matter of fact, the approximation
of f proposed by DK may not represent a well–defined probability in a heterogeneous population.
For example, the approximation of f can even be larger than 1, which is undesirable since f mea-
sures the rate of persuasion. In this regard, we build on DK but add important clarifications to
the literature. Further, we establish the sharp identified bounds of θ under various data scenarios,
which we will discuss below.
In deriving the sharp identified bounds of θ, we consider three different data scenarios: i.e. the
outcome and the treatment are jointly observed, they are separately observed, or the treatment is
not observed at all.4 The first case is most ideal, the third case is least informative, and the second
case is motivated by the data structure in DK. In addition to θ, we introduce the local and marginal
persuasion rates, say θlocal and θmte, and we investigate their identification as well. The former
is defined as the persuasive effect for the subpopulation of compliers (e.g. Imbens and Angrist,
1994) and the latter is the persuasive effect defined at a particular value of the unobserved random
variable governing selection assignment as in e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).
The main findings of this paper are as follows. First, the persuasion rate θ is partially identified
and its sharp lower bound is the same across the three data scenarios: the sharp lower bound
depends only on the joint distribution of (Yi, Zi). In terms of DK’s notation used above, the sharp
lower bound of θ is shown to be (yT − yC)/(1− yC), which is often computed as a lower bound of f
when y0 is approximated by yC and eT − eC is unknown. Therefore, our identification results show
that the bound (yT − yC)/(1− yC) is not only sharp but also robust to the presence of endogeneity
4The case that the outcome and the treatment are separately observed belongs to an identification problem called the “eco-
logical inference” problem. For instance, Cross and Manski (2002) and Manski (2018) discuss bounding a “long regression”
by using information from a “short regression.” Their substantive concerns are distinct from ours.
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as well as heterogeneity in the persuasion effect. Further, knowing eT and eC does not improve the
lower bound at all, which we find surprising. Second, the sharp upper bound of θ depends on the
data scenarios, with more favorable data scenarios yielding tighter bounds: i.e. knowing eT and eC
improves the upper bound of θ in general. Third, the local persuasion rate θlocal is point identified
when the outcome, the actual exposure to persuasion, and the intent–to–treat are jointly observed.
Otherwise, it is only partially identified. Finally, the marginal persuasion rate θmte can be point
identified if Zi is continuously distributed.
We illustrate the usefulness of our identification results by applying them to two strands of the
empirical literature on persuasion, i.e. the effects of media on voting and door–to–door fund rais-
ing. When we revisit DK using their original data, we find that the identification region for the
average persuasion rate θ is between 1% and 99% and that the lower bound for the local aver-
age persuasion rate θlocal is either 12% or 37%, depending on the specification of the fixed effects.
These results suggest that the persuasive effect of Fox News is fairly large for compliers, i.e. those
who would watch Fox News if and only if it is randomly available, but that DK’s data are unin-
formative about the general population. Overall, our empirical results show that heterogeneity in
the persuasion effect is an important issue and randomizing the “intent–to–treat” does not render
identification of θ in general.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a simple economic
model to motivate our setup. Focusing on a binary treatment and a binary outcome, we formulate
a model of persuasion within the framework of expected utility maximization. This formulation
naturally leads to a potential outcome setup with a certain monotonicity restriction. In section 3 we
discuss identification results for θ, and in section 4 we provide corresponding results for θlocal and
θmte. In section 5.1, we clarify the difference between f and θ as well as the relationship between f
and θlocal. Section 5.2 summarizes our recommendations about what to estimate and how to inter-
pret. Specifically, we discuss in detail which parameters should be reported among the identified
ones in each data scenario and how they should be interpreted. In section 6, we revisit the empir-
ical literature on the effects of news media on voting, where we apply our identification results to
three published articles. In section 7, we look at the literature on door-to-door fund raising and
illustrate the usefulness of our results by applying them to two published papers. In section 8, we
consider semiparametrically efficient estimation of the two key parameters, i.e. the lower bound of
θ and θlocal, and we provide an empirical illustration. In section 9, we give concluding remarks.
The appendix contains the proofs.
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2. A BINARY CHOICE MODEL UNDER UNCERTAINTY
We consider a binary choice problem under binary states. The states are unknown to the agent
at the time of the decision and the agent relies on her subjective belief about them to make a de-
cision. We assume that there is an informational treatment such as watching a particular news
channel, which potentially affects the agent’s belief about the states and hence her choice as well.
Our interest is in the econometric analysis of the informational treatment effect, i.e. the effect of
persuasion. For instance, a news media is often claimed to be biased and it tries to convince voters
to choose a candidate from a particular party: e.g. Fox News promoting Republican candidates or
The Washington Post supporting Democratic ones. Our framework below provides a formal way
of analyzing the persuasive effect when treatment is potentially endogenous.5
Suppose that there are two possible states, denoted by S ∈ S = {High, Low}. Let Ti ∈ {0, 1}
indicate individual i’s status of the informational treatment. Further, let qi(t) describe individual
i’s subjective belief about the state when Ti is set to t ∈ {0, 1}: i.e. qi(t) = P(S = High|Ti =
t, Ii), where Ii denotes all other information available to individual i. Table 1 describes the utility
individual i receives from each choice conditional on the state. The payoffs matrix in table 1 is from
Bergemann and Morris (2017, see matrix (3)).
TABLE 1. Utility by choice and state
S = Low S = High
Vote (1) −1 Ui ≥ 0
Not vote (0) 0 0
The utility from option 0 is normalized to be 0 for each state. Since the expected utility is all that
matters for the decision, the utility from option 1 when the state is “low” is normalized to be −1:
the sign restrictions are to make the choice nontrivial. The utility term Ui is not observed by the
econometrician.
Suppose that individual i maximizes her expected utility. Then, individual i chooses option 1
if and only if her expected utility, −(1− qi) + qiUi, is positive with her belief qi about the state.
Therefore, when the informational treatment is set to be t ∈ {0, 1}, the potential outcome Yi(t) can
5 As a different example, imagine consumers facing a decision problem about whether to purchase a durable good or not
when the quality of the good, which can be “high” or “low”, is uncertain. Each consumer has her own belief about the
quality of the good, which may depend on whether she has read an advertisement brochure or not. Reading the brochure
is an informational treatment of interest.
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be written as follows:
Yi(t) = 1
[−{1− qi(t)}+ qi(t)Ui ≥ 0], (2)
where 1[·] is the usual indicator function. We now make the following assumptions.
Assumption A. Ui has a conditional density f {·|qi(0), qi(1)} such that f {u|qi(0), qi(1)} > 0 for all
u ∈ [0,∞) with probability one.
Assumption B. qi(0) ≤ qi(1) with probability one.
Assumption A says that Ui is continuously distributed given qi(0), qi(1). However, it does not
rule out the possibility that Ui and qi(t) are dependent on each other. Assumption B simply means
that the informational treatment may shift an agent’s belief only in one direction.
As mentioned before, the outcome variable Yi observed by the econometrician is given by
Yi = TiYi(1) + (1− Ti)Yi(0), (3)
where Ti may not always be observed. For example, in the context of marketing (see footnote 5
), it is easily observable if a consumer has received an advertisement brochure, but it is rarely ob-
served whether the consumer has actually read it or not. We will analyze a few different scenarios
regarding how much information associated with Ti is available to the econometrician.
In addition to the outcome Yi, we assume that the econometrician observes a binary “intent–to–
treat” variable, which will be denoted by Zi.6 Throughout the paper we assume that Zi is randomly
assigned and Ti has a simple threshold structure, i.e.
Ti = 1{Vi ≤ e(Zi)}. (4)
We summarize this in the following assumption.
Assumption C. Ti has the threshold structure in equation (4), where Vi is uniformly distributed, and
0 ≤ e(0) < e(1) ≤ 1. Further, Zi is independent of
(
qi(t), Ui, Vi
)
for t = 0, 1.
Therefore, the function e is the propensity score, or more descriptively in our context, it can be
referred to as the exposure rate.
Recall that we are interested in the rate of persuasion: θ = P{Yi(1) = 1|Yi(0) = 0}. Assump-
tion B has an important implication for us, which we state as a lemma.
6In section 4, we consider the case that Zi is continuously distributed.
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Lemma 1. Under assumption A, assumption B is equivalent to Yi(0) ≤ Yi(1) with probability one. There-
fore,
θ =
P{Yi(1) = 1} −P{Yi(0) = 1}
1−P{Yi(0) = 1} . (5)
Therefore, identification of θ can be achieved by identifying two counterfactual probabilities
P{Yi(1) = 1} and P{Yi(0) = 1}: i.e. we do not need to know the joint distribution of Yi(0) and
Yi(1).7 In fact, since Yi(t) is binary, θ is the average treatment effect (ATE) divided byP{Yi(0) = 0}.
In addition to (Yi, Ti, Zi), one may observe covariates Xi. In many applications, it would be im-
portant to control for covariates. Throughout the paper, we implicitly assume that all assumptions
and results are conditional on the value of covariates. We suppress it from the notation, unless it is
necessary.
3. IDENTIFICATION OF θ
As we mentioned earlier, Ti can be difficult to observe directly. The most favorable situation is
probably the one in which there is no difference between the actual treatment and the intent–to–
treat. We will refer to this case as the sharp persuasion design. However, in social sciences, the sharp
design is rather an exceptional scenario. More realistically, the actual treatment tends to differ from
the intent–to–treat, which will be referred to as the fuzzy persuasion design.
The most challenging scenario in the fuzzy design is the one where we do not have any in-
formation other than the joint distribution of (Yi, Zi). The most ideal situation is the one where
(Yi, Ti, Zi) is jointly observed. However, these two extremes are not the only possibilities. For
example, the researcher may have two different data sources from which P(Yi = 1|Zi = z) and
e(z) = P(Ti = 1|Zi = z) are separately revealed. In fact, DK used town–level election data to
estimate P(Yi = 1|Zi = z) and microlevel audience data to infer e(z) = P(Ti = 1|Zi = z). In our
analysis, we consider these three different scenarios in the fuzzy design regarding data availability.8
It turns out that point identification of the persuasion rate θ is generally not available with binary
Zi, even if the full joint distribution of (Yi, Ti, Zi) is observable. Indeed, among the cases we have
studied in the paper, the sharp persuasion design is the only case where θ is point identified, and
in all fuzzy design cases, θ is only partially identified up to an interval with the same lower bound
7If Yi were non-binary, identification of θ would be much harder. In that case, it would be necessary to know about the joint
distribution of Yi(1) and Yi(0).
8 In our analysis we assume Ti is correctly measured if it is observed. See Calvi, Lewbel, and Tommasi (2017), Nguimkeu,
Denteh, and Tchernis (2018), and Ura (2018) for the issues of mismeasured treatment. Their subject matters are distinct from
ours.
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θL, which is defined by
θL =
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)
1−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0) . (6)
The parameter θL is identified with the joint distribution of (Yi, Zi) only.
3.1. The Sharp Persuasion Design. We first consider the simplest scenario, i.e. the one where
everybody complies with the intent–to–treat. This case arises if and only if e(1)− e(0) = 1, in which
case the entire population only consists of compliers.
Assumption D. We have e(1)− e(0) = 1, i.e. Ti = Zi with probability one.
Under assumption D, there is essentially no difference between Ti and Zi, and therefore it is a
standard exercise to show the identification of the distribution of the potential outcomes.
Theorem 1. Suppose that assumptions A to D hold. Then, for z = 0, 1, we have P{Yi(z) = 1} = P(Yi =
1|Zi = z). In particular, θ = θL.
Under assumption D there is no difference between the actual treatment assignment and the
intent–to–treat. Therefore, Ti is essentially observed and it is randomly assigned. In this case, the
identification analysis is the same as that of the average treatment effect under unconfoundedness.
In fact, the potential outcomes are binary and they have a similar structure to the treatment assign-
ment Ti, from which more intuition for theorem 1 can be obtained.
To see this, note that, by lemma 1, there are three subpopulations:
Never–voters: Yi(0) = 0, Yi(1) = 0,
Responders: Yi(0) = 0, Yi(1) = 1,
Always–voters: Yi(0) = 1, Yi(1) = 1.
In the context of voting as in DK, “Always–voters” can be referred to as “Republicans,” and “non–
Republicans” consists of “never–Republicans” and “those who respond to Fox News.” Then, what
the observation of (Yi, Zi) can reveal about which group individual i belongs to can be summarized
as follows.
Table 2 provides an intuitive illustration about the identification of θ by θL: θL captures the
portion of “responders” among the “non–always–voters.” However, note that we cannot identify
which individual is a “persuaded one” just as the group of compliers is generally unidentified in
the population.
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TABLE 2. Identification of the Persuasion Rate
Yi = 0 Yi = 1
Zi = 0 Never–voter or Responder Always–voter
Zi = 1 Never–voter Always–voter or Responder
3.2. The Fuzzy Persuasion Design. Assumption D assumes away the existence of never–takers
and always–takers. In this subsection we discuss how far we can go without assumption D. It will
be shown that θ is only partially identified even if data reveal the full joint distribution of (Yi, Ti, Zi).
If Yi and Ti are not jointly observed or Ti is not observed at all, then the sharp identified interval of
θ becomes wider. However, it turns out that the sharp lower bound stays the same in all three cases
we consider, and it coincides with θL. Throughout this section, we assume that the joint distribution
of (Yi, Zi) is identified directly from data.
3.2.1. Identification with the Joint Distribution of (Yi, Ti, Zi). We start with the case where the richest
dataset is available.
Assumption E. The joint distribution of (Yi, Ti, Zi) is known, where both e(0) and 1− e(1) are bounded
away from zero.
Assumption E does not generally deliver point identification of θ. Before we discuss partial iden-
tification results under assumption E, we first explain what challenges we face here with table 3.
TABLE 3. Lack of Identification of θ
Yi = 0 Yi = 1
Zi = 0
Ti = 0 (Never–taker or Complier) Never–voter or Responder Always–voter
Ti = 1 (Always–taker) Never–voter Always–voter or Responder
Zi = 1
Ti = 0 (Never–taker) Never–voter or Responder Always–voter
Ti = 1 (Always–taker or Complier) Never–voter Always–voter or Responder
The event (Zi, Ti) = (0, 0) represents a different subpopulation from what (Zi, Ti) = (0, 1) does.
Therefore, comparing P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Ti = 0) with P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Ti = 1) does not lead to
anything meaningful. Indeed, the only subpopulation we can learn about from Zi = 0 and Zi = 1
in common is the one of “compliers”, just as the Wald statistic estimates only the local average
9
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treatment effect (LATE), not the ATE. Although θ is not generally point–identified, we can derive
its sharp identified bounds under assumption E.
Theorem 2. Suppose that assumptions A to C and E are satisfied. Then, the sharp identified interval of θ is
given by [θL, θU ], where θL is given in equation (6) and
θU =
P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = 1)−P(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|Zi = 0) + 1− e(1)
1−P(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|Zi = 0) .
The bounds in theorem 2 shrink to a singleton as
(
e(0), e(1)
)
approaches (0, 1), which is not
surprising given the result in theorem 1. Also, it is worth noting that the lower bound θL only
depends on the distribution of (Yi, Zi): observing Ti along with (Yi, Zi) helps only for the upper
bound. If e(1) is too small, then the upper bound will not be very informative: θU converges to
1 as e(1) approaches 0: i.e. if nobody reads a brochure, then we do not learn much about how
“persuading” the brochure is. However, even if e(1) approaches 1, the upper bound does not
necessarily shrink to the lower bound. In other words, even if everybody is always exposed to an
advertisement, we do not necessarily pin down the persuasion rate of the advertisement.
3.2.2. Identification with the Knowledge of the Exposure Rates. We now consider a situation in which
Ti is not observed but the researcher has knowledge about the exposure rates e(0) and e(1). For
instance, one may have two different data sources for (Yi, Zi) and (Ti, Zi) as in DK.
In this section we treat e(0) and e(1) as “parameters,” and we obtain the sharp identified bounds
of θ under the assumption that e(0) and e(1) are known. If the researcher’s prior knowledge about
{e(0), e(1)} is only probabilistic, then e(0) and e(1) in the bounds can be averaged out.
Assumption F. Ti is not observed but the exposure rates {e(0), e(1)} are known.
Theorem 3. Suppose that assumptions A to C and F are satisfied. Then, the sharp identified interval of θ is
given by [θL, θUe ], where θL is given in equation (6) and
θUe =
min{1,P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) + 1− e(1)} −max{0, P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)− e(0)}
1−max{0, P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)− e(0)} . (7)
Therefore, the upper bound in this case is nontrivial if and only if e(1) > P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1): it is
the relative size of the take–up rate e(1), i.e. the probability of reading a brochure when it is mailed,
that determines how much we can hope to learn about the persuasion rate. Figure 1 illustrates how
the identified set of θ changes for different values of e(z) when P(Yi = 1|Zi = z) is given. The
difference between θUe − θL gets smaller as e(1) approaches 1 for each value of e(0).
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FIGURE 1. An Example of the Length of the Identified Interval of θ
0 P0 0.5 1
0
P1
0.5
1
e(0)
e(1)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
θUe − θL
Note: We set P0 = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0) = 1/4 and P1 = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) = 1/3.
Therefore, θL = 1/9 but θUe varies as e(0) and e(1) vary.
3.2.3. Identification with No Information Associated with Ti. Figure 1 readily shows that the upper
bound of θ becomes trivial if e(0), e(1) are totally unknown. For the sake of completeness we state
this in a separate theorem.
Assumption G. No information associated with Ti is available: i.e. the distribution of (Yi, Zi) is all that is
known.
Theorem 4. Suppose that assumptions A to C and G are satisfied. Then, the sharp bound of θ is given by
[θL, 1], where θL is given in equation (6).
4. THE LOCAL AND MARGINAL PERSUASION RATES
In this section we consider two alternative parameters, i.e. the local and marginal persuasion
rates, defined by
θlocal = P{Yi(1) = 1|Yi(0) = 0, e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)} (8)
and
θmte(v) = P{Yi(1) = 1|Yi(0) = 0, Vi = v} (9)
11
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for 0 < v < 1. Here, θlocal is the persuasion rate for the subpopulation characterized by e(0) < Vi ≤
e(1), i.e. the compliers (e.g. Imbens and Angrist, 1994), whereas θmte(v) is for the subpopulation
such that Vi = v (e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005).
To analyze these two parameters, we replace assumption A with the following condition.
Assumption H. Ui has a conditional density f {·|qi(0), qi(1), Vi} such that f {u|qi(0), qi(1), Vi} > 0 for
all u ∈ [0,∞) with probability one.
We first focus on θlocal. By the same reasoning as lemma 1, we have
θlocal =
E{Yi(1)−Yi(0) | e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)}
P(Yi(0) = 0 | e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)} , (10)
where the numerator is the local average treatment effect (LATE), which has received a great deal
of attention in the econometrics literature (see, e.g., Deaton, 2010; Heckman, 2010; Imbens, 2010, for
a recent debate).
Just like LATE, it is contentious whether or not θlocal should be the parameter of interest since
the compliers are concerned with an unidentified subgroup of the population. We take a practical
view that the identification results on θlocal can complement the results obtained in section 3. The
following theorem shows the identification of θlocal under the different scenarios of data availability.
Theorem 5. Suppose that assumptions B, C and H are satisfied.
(i) Under assumption E, θlocal is point identified by θlocal = θ∗, where
θ∗ = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)
P(Yi = 0, Ti = 0|Zi = 0)−P(Yi = 0, Ti = 0|Zi = 1) .
(ii) Under assumption F, the sharp identified interval of θlocal is given by [θ∗L, 1], where
θ∗L =
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)
min{1−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0), e(1)− e(0)} .
(iii) Under assumption G, the sharp identified interval of θlocal coincides with that of θ, i.e.
[
θL, 1
]
.
It is well known that the numerator of equation (10) is identified by the Wald statistic:
E{Yi(1)−Yi(0) | e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)} = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)e(1)− e(0) .
In addition, we need to identify the denominator of equation (10). It is important to notice that the
identification of the LATE requires the distribution of (Ti, Zi) and that of (Yi, Zi) separately, but not
the joint distribution of (Yi, Ti, Zi). Unlike the LATE, the point identification in part (i) of theorem 5
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demands the knowledge of the joint distribution of (Yi, Ti, Zi): the denominator of equation (10)
requires that we know the marginal distribution of Yi(0) for the compliers (see e.g. Imbens and
Rubin, 1997). Part (ii) of theorem 5 shows that this requirement is not only sufficient but also
necessary to achieve the point identification of θlocal. The local persuasion rate θlocal represents the
average persuasive effect for a population that is different from the entire population. Given this
caveat, it is interesting to note that in part (ii), the upper bound of θlocal is always trivial in contrast
to θ, but the lower bound of θlocal can never be worse than that of θ. Therefore, in principle, the
length of the identified interval of θ can be smaller than that of θlocal. If Ti is not observed at all, then
there is no advantage in focusing on the compliers. Part (iii) of theorem 5 confirms the intuition
that the bound for θlocal is identical to θ if the distribution of (Yi, Zi) is the only piece of information
available. This corresponds to the uninteresting case for θlocal though since we have no information
on compliers.
We now move to θmte(v). If Yi and Ti are jointly observed along with a continuous instrument
Zi, then θmte(v) can be point identified as in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005); Carneiro, Heckman,
and Vytlacil (2011). Examples of continuous instruments can be found in the literature on the me-
dia effects on voting. For instance, Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011) and DellaVigna,
Enikolopov, Mironova, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2014) use the signal strength of NTV and Ser-
bian radio as instruments, respectively: in both of the papers, (Yi, Ti, Zi) are jointly observed.
The following assumption describes the situation in which we discuss the identification of θmte(v).
Using the standard results in the literature (e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005), it is then straightfor-
ward to obtain the identification of θmte(v), which we state in the subsequent theorem.
Assumption I. (i) The joint distribution of (Yi, Ti, Zi) is known.
(ii) Ti has the threshold structure in equation (4), where Vi is uniformly distributed, and Zi is indepen-
dent of
(
qi(t), Ui, Vi
)
for t = 0, 1.
(iii) The distribution of e(Zi) is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, where v is in
the interior of the support of e(Zi).
Theorem 6. Suppose that assumptions B, H and I are satisfied. Then θmte(v) is point identified by
θmte(v) =
∂P{Yi = 1|e(Zi) = e}/∂e|e=v
1− ∂P{Yi = 1, Ti = 0|e(Zi) = e}/∂e|e=v , (11)
provided that P{Yi = 1|e(Zi) = e} and P{Yi = 1, Ti = 0|e(Zi) = e} are continuously differentiable with
respect to e.
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Theorem 6 does not consider the other two scenarios of data availability. We do this for two
reasons. One is that continuous instruments are rare in the context of persuasion and we are not
aware of any applications, where continuous instruments are available while the outcome and
treatment are not jointly observed. Second, attempts to bound θmte(v) in the other data scenario will
involve bounding a derivative, for which we need more than the bounds of the level. For example,
if we only know e(Zi) and the joint distribution of (Yi, Zi), then the denominator of equation (11)
is not identified. Further, bounding P{Yi = 1, Ti = 0|e(Zi) = e} does not generally lead to useful
bounds of its derivative without additional assumptions. Therefore, we do not pursue this in the
current paper.
If the support of the exposure rate e(Zi) is equal to the unit interval [0, 1], then theorem 6 shows
the identification of θmte(v) for all v in the unit interval. Then, we can use θmte(v) to construct
different policy oriented quantities as in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Carneiro, Heckman, and
Vytlacil (2011). For instance, the persuasion rate of the entire population θ will be given by
θ =
∫ 1
0
θmte(v)dv,
because Vi is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
5. DISCUSSIONS
5.1. Measuring Persuasive Effects in the Literature. We now discuss the relationship between our
parameters of persuasive effects and the ones that were used in the literature. For this purpose we
focus on the binary instrument case.
The population version of DK’s proposal f is
θDK =
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)
e(1)− e(0)
1
1−P{Yi(0) = 1} , (12)
which is often approximated by
θ˜DK =
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)
e(1)− e(0)
1
1−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0) . (13)
Note here that θ˜DK does not require any knowledge about the joint distribution of (Yi, Ti) given Zi.
We now discuss the relationship between θ, θlocal, and θDK. By equation (31) in the proof of
theorem 5, we have
P{Yi(0) = 0}θDK = P{Yi(0) = 0|e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)}θlocal = E{Yi(1)−Yi(0)|e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)}
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under assumptions B, C and H. Further, recall from lemma 1 that
P{Yi(0) = 0}θ = E{Yi(1)−Yi(0)}.
Therefore, θ, θlocal, and θDK are different parameters in general. For example, θDK rescales the
LATE with an unconditional probability, and hence it does not render a well–defined conditional
probability in general.
There are some special cases where the three parameters coincide. For example, θ = θDK holds
if and only if the ATE equals the LATE. This happens, for example, if at least one of the following
three conditions hold:
(i) the entire population consists of compliers, i.e. e(0) = 0 and e(1) = 1, as in the sharp
persuasion design;
(ii) Yi(1)−Yi(0) is a constant;
(iii) Vi is independent of
(
qi(t), Ui
)
for t = 0, 1, in which case the potential outcome Yi(t) is
independent of Ti conditional on Zi.
Condition (ii) corresponds to the situation with no heterogeneity in the treatment effect. This is
probably the least interesting condition because there are only two unrealistic possibilities for this:
either Yi(1) − Yi(0) = 1 (everyone is persuaded) or Yi(1) − Yi(0) = 0 (no one has room for per-
suasion). Under condition (i), there is no difference between the intent–to–treat and the actual
treatment, in which case randomizing the intent–to–treat is sufficient to identify θ. Condition (iii)
is often referred to as the condition of unconfoundedness or selection on observables in econometrics.
Since P{Yi(0) = 1} = P{Yi(0) = 1 | e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)} under conditions (i) or (iii), we have
θ = θlocal = θDK under either of the two conditions.
Unlike the three parameters, θ˜DK generally does not measure the effect of persuasion even under
condition (iii). However, as DK correctly pointed out, it is an approximation of θDK(= θ = θlocal)
when e(0) is close to zero or θ = 0.9 θ˜DK has some interesting features though: observing the
two marginals of (Yi, Zi) and (Ti, Zi) is sufficient for its identification, and it has a simple lower
bound θL that can be identified without observing Ti at all. Indeed, DellaVigna and Gentzkow
(2010) extensively reports θ˜DK or its lower bound θL, depending on whether Ti is observed or not.
However, θ˜DK should be interpreted with caution: θL is always a meaningful estimand but θ˜DK
is not. When information about e(0) and e(1) is available, it seems a better practice to report θL
together with θ∗L than to estimate θ˜DK.
9Under condition (iii), we have P(Yi = 1|Zi = z) = P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = z) + P(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|Zi = z) = P{Yi(0) =
1}+ [P{Yi(1) = 1} −P{Yi(0) = 1}]e(z).
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It is worth pointing out that θL is not only a lower bound of θ˜DK but also the sharp lower bound
of θ in a much more general sense. Specifically, neither condition (iii) nor approximation by θ˜DK
is needed, and therefore the bound is robust to both the presence of endogeneity in the treatment
assignment and poor approximation of θDK by θ˜DK.
Finally, as an aside we point out that without condition (iii), θDK does not measure the persuasion
rate of any subpopulation correctly: the first factor on the right–hand side of equation (12) focuses
on a subpopulation of “compliers,” while the second factor is not conditioned on the complier
group.
5.2. Main Takeaways from Our Results. Focusing on the binary instrument case, we have pro-
posed five estimands, namely θL, θ∗L, θ∗, θU , and θUe . Which of those parameters can be estimated
depends on whether and how Ti is observed. Below is the summary of the proposed estimands and
their interpretation in each of the three data scenarios. Note that “no endogeneity” here means that
either there is no difference between the intent–to–treat and the actual treatment, or the potential
outcomes are independent of the actual treatment given the intent–to–treat.
(1) If (Yi, Ti, Zi) are jointly observed, then estimate θL, θU , and θ∗.
(a) In general, [θL, θU ] is the sharp identified interval of the persuasion rate for the pop-
ulation, and θ∗ is the persuasion rate for the group of compliers.
(b) With no endogeneity, θ∗ is the persuasion rate for the group of compliers as well as
for the population. (θL is just a lower bound of it, which is not sharp.)
(2) If (Yi, Zi) and (Ti, Zi) are separately observed, then estimate θL, θUe , and θ
∗
L.
(a) In general, [θL, θUe ] is the sharp identified interval for the persuasion rate for the
population, and [θ∗L, 1] is the sharp identified interval for the persuasion rate for the
group of compliers.
(b) With no endogeneity, [θ∗L, 1] is the sharp identified interval for the persuasion rate for
the group of compliers as well as for the entire population.
(3) If (Yi, Zi) is all that is observed, then estimate θL.
(a) With or without endogeneity, [θL, 1] is the sharp identified interval for the persuasion
rate for the group of compliers as well as for the entire population.
Note that θL should always be estimated. Further, we recommend that θ∗L or θ∗ should also be re-
ported together, depending on data availability, for two reasons. First, θL is always a lower bound
of the persuasion rate for the population but it may not be sharp when there is no endogeneity.
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Second, even if endogeneity is a potential concern, θ∗L and θ∗ provide information about the per-
suasion rate for the group of compliers. If the upper bound is also of interest, then θU or θUe can be
reported as well.
As we mentioned earlier, the actual treatment Ti may be difficult to observe. For example, it
is more costly to obtain data on whether or not individuals have read The Washington Post than
to observe if they received free subscriptions to it. The value of observing Ti depends on which
parameter a researcher is interested in. Suppose that θ is the parameter of interest. If the informa-
tional treatment Ti is not observed, then θL is the only parameter that can be estimated. Moreover,
it is the sharp lower bound even if we observe Ti. Therefore, if a researcher would like to learn
about the persuasive effect for the entire population, the benefit of an attempt to observe Ti by e.g.
conducting a follow–up survey is limited and can only come from tightening the upper bound. If
the cost of collecting extra data on Ti is too high, then an alternative approach is to compute the
upper bound θUe as a function of {e(1), e(0)} so that readers can rely on their own prior on the
exposure rate. However, the value of observing Ti can be high if θlocal is the parameter of interest.
It is point-identified if (Yi, Ti, Zi) are jointly observed, and its lower bound is improved even if the
exposure rates {e(1), e(0)} are only known. In a nutshell, our identification analysis shows that the
value of observing Ti depends crucially on which population is of interest to a researcher.
6. EXAMPLES: THE EFFECTS OF MEDIA ON VOTING
In this section, we revisit the recent empirical literature on the effects of media on voting and
apply our identification results.
6.1. Reading a Newspaper: Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009) Revisited. Gerber, Karlan, and
Bergan (2009, GKB hereafter) reported findings from a field experiment to measure the effect of
political news. In GKB, there were three treatments, or more precisely three statuses in the intention
to treat: a control group, an offer of free subscription to The Washington Post, and one to The
Washington Times. To illustrate the usefulness of our paper, we focus on The Washington Post and
drop all observations from The Washington Times subscription. That is, Zi = 1 if the ith individual
received free subscription to The Washington Post, and Zi = 0 if not.
GKB focused on the intent–to–treat (ITT) analysis and have reported ITT estimates for various
outcomes Yi. When DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) computed persuasion rates for GKB, they
considered that Ti = 1 if the ith individual opted into the free subscription and Ti = 0 if he/she
opted out of it.
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In this section, for the purpose of illustrating our identification results, we consider a different
treatment variable: Ti = 1 if the ith individual reads the newspaper at least several times per
week and Ti = 0 otherwise. Therefore, the relevant treatment we consider differs from GKB’s ITT
analysis, but it is whether individuals have actually read the newspaper or not, which is kept track
of in a follow–up survey. The binary outcome we consider is as follows : Yi = 1 if the ith individual
reported voting for the Democratic candidate in the 2005 gubernatorial election and Yi = 0 if the
subject did not vote for the Democratic candidate or did not vote at all. We use only a subsample of
the GKB data with those who responded to the follow–up survey to use information on (Yi, Ti, Zi)
jointly. After dropping observations for The Washington Times subscription and removing missing
data, we summarize the GKB data in table 4.
TABLE 4. Summary statistics of the GKB data
The Washington Post (Zi = 1)
Reads the newspaper Total
Voted for Democrat Ti = 0 Ti = 1
Yi = 0 94 93 187
Yi = 1 31 68 99
Total 125 161 286
Control (Zi = 0)
Reads the newspaper Total
Voted for Democrat Ti = 0 Ti = 1
Yi = 0 162 130 292
Yi = 1 46 77 123
Total 208 207 415
We can now compute all of our bounds by hand using table 4. First of all, the ITT effect is
estimated by
Pˆ(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)− Pˆ(Yi = 1|Zi = 0) = 0.0498.
Throughout this section, a hat refers to the sample estimate based on table 4. Although the joint
distribution of (Yi, Ti, Zi) is observed in this example, we also considered using the two marginals
of (Yi, Zi) and (Ti, Zi) separately, to make a comparison. The estimates are summarized in table 5
First, we discuss the case where the full joint distribution of (Yi, Ti, Zi) is used. In this data
scenario, the average effect of persuasion by reading The Washington Post is bounded between 7%
and 63%. In contrast, the persuasion rate for the group of complies is point estimated by 81%. It is
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TABLE 5. The Estimates of the Key Parameters
(Yi, Ti, Zi) (Yi, Ti) and (Ti, Zi)
θ [0.0707, 0.6343] [0.0707, 0.7832]
θlocal 0.8067 [0.7759, 1]
a The first row corresponds to [θˆL, θˆU ] and [θˆL, θˆUe ], respec-
tively. The second row shows θˆ∗ and [θ∗L, 1], respectively.
interesting to note that the estimate of θlocal is so large that it is greater than the upper bound of θ.
This suggests that individuals are highly heterogeneous in this example, indicating that θ˜DK might
not be a well–defined parameter here. Indeed, its estimate is
θ˜DK =
Pˆ(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)− Pˆ(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)
eˆ(1)− eˆ(0)
1
1− Pˆ(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)
= 1.1027,
which is greater than 1.
When the marginals of (Yi, Zi) and (Ti, Zi) are used separately, the upper bound of θ increases
from 63% to 78%. Further, θlocal is not point estimated anymore but we only know that it is bounded
between 78% and 100%. This difference illustrates the loss of identification power if we do not
observe the joint distribution of (Yi, Ti, Zi).
6.2. The Effect of Fox News: DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) Revisited. In DK, the entry of Fox
News in cable markets plays a role of an instrument conditional on a set of covariates. That is, Zi is
a binary variable that equals one if Fox News was part of local cable package in the town where the
ith individual was living in 2000. To apply our result to DK, let Yi be the binary dependent variable
that equals one if individual i voted for the Republican candidate in the 2000 presidential election.
As DK argue in their paper, Fox News availability in 2000 is likely to be idiosyncratic, only after
controlling for a set of covariates. We will be explicit about conditioning on covariates Xi to apply
our identification results, and we write the lower bound as a function of the values of Xi: i.e.
θ˜L(x) =
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1, Xi = x)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x)
1−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x) , (14)
which is the sharp lower bound of P{Yi(1) = 1|Yi(0) = 0, Xi = x}, the conditional persuasion rate.
Then, to obtain the lower bound for the persuasion rate in the population, we integrate (14) with
respect to the distribution FX of Xi, so that
θL =
∫
θ˜L(x)dFX(x).
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Note that Xi is first controlled for and is averaged out.
To estimate θL, we use DK’s data10 and adopt similar specifications as in DK. They estimated
P(Yi = 1|Zi, Xi) using a town–level linear regression model, where the dependent variable is the
Republican two–party vote share for the 2000 presidential election minus the same variable for the
1996 election. To be consistent with our econometric framework, we modify the dependent variable
to be the votes cast for the Republican candidate in the 2000 presidential election divided by the
population of age 18 and older. Recall that in our setup, Yi = 0 if individual i did not voted for
the Republican candidate. This event includes the case of voting for different candidates or that of
not voting for any candidate at all. As the town–level covariates, we include the Republican vote
share as a share of the voting–age population in the 1996 election, census controls for both 1990
and 2000, cable system controls, and US House district fixed effects (or county fixed effects). These
specifications correspond to the main specifications of DK (see columns (4) and (5) of table IV in
DK). In the regression, the town–level observations are weighted by the population of age 18 and
older in 1996.
DK used two different data sources for (Yi, Zi) and (Ti, Zi). Hence, we can look at the upper
bound for θ and the lower bound for θlocal using these. Again, making use of the covariates explic-
itly, we rewrite (7) as
θUe =
∫
θ˜Ue(x)dFX(x),
where
θ˜Ue(x) =
min{1,P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1, Xi = x) + 1− e(1, x)} −max{0, P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x)− e(0, x)}
1−max{0, P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x)− e(0, x)} ,
and e(z, x) = P(Ti = 1|Zi = z, Xi = x). We also re-write the bounds in part (ii) of Theorem 5 as∫
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1, Xi = x)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x)
min{1−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x), e(1, x)− e(0, x)} dFX(x|e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)) ≤ θlocal ≤ 1.
(15)
By Bayes’ theorem, the lower bound in (15) can be re-written as∫
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1, Xi = x)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x)
min{1−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x), e(1, x)− e(0, x)} dFX(x|e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1))
=
∫
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1, Xi = x)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x)
min{1−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x), e(1, x)− e(0, x)}
e(1, x)− e(0, x)∫ {e(1, x)− e(0, x)}dFX(x)dFX(x),
which can be estimated directly from data.
10The data used in DK are available at http://eml.berkeley.edu/~sdellavi/index.html.
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DK estimated e(z, x) using the microlevel Scarborough data on television audiences. We focus
on “diary audience” measure in DK11 and take the same specifications as in columns (2) and (3) of
table VIII from DK.
TABLE 6. Persuasion Rates: Fox News Effects
(1) (2)
U.S. House district County
fixed effects fixed effects
θ [0.005,0.991] [0.011,0.992]
θlocal [0.115,1] [0.370,1]
Table 6 summarizes our empirical results.12 Column (1) shows estimation results when U.S.
House district fixed effects are controlled for and column (2) displays corresponding results for
county fixed effects.
The bounds for θ are wide and uninformative. However, the lower bounds for θlocal are siz-
able and also comparable to the estimates of the persuasion rates reported in DK (0.11 and 0.28,
respectively). In sum, we conclude that the persuasive effect of Fox News seems fairly large for
the compliers, that is, those who would watch the Fox News channel if and only if it is randomly
available.
6.3. The NTV Effect: Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011) Revisited. As mentioned
earlier, Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011, EPZ hereafter) used a continuous instrument,
i.e. the signal strength of NTV, to measure the persuasive effect of watching NTV (the anti-Putin TV
station) on a parliamentary election in 1999. Further, in the individual–level survey data in EPZ,
(Yi, Ti, Zi) are jointly observed. Therefore, in this subsection, we apply the identification result of
the marginal persuasion rate to this example using the EPZ data.
We look at two parties: the progovernment party “Unity” and the most popular opposition party
OVR (“Fatherland–All Russsia”). During the 1999 election campaign, Unity was opposed by NTV,
while OVR were supported by NTV. Thus, EPZ presumed a negative persuasion rate for voting
for Unity but a positive persuasion rate for OVR. To be consistent with our theoretical framework
and other empirical examples, Yi is either YUnity,i or YOVR,i, depending on which party we consider.
11The microlevel Scarborough data contain the “recall” measure regarding whether a respondent watched a given channel
in the past seven days and the “diary” measure on whether a respondent watched a channel for at least one full half-an-hour
block according to the seven-day diary.
12To estimate the unconditional bounds reported in the table, the conditional ones are weighted by the number of respon-
dents in a town for the Scarborough data. In addition, the predicted probabilities are truncated to be between 0 and 1.
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Specifically, we let YUnity,i = 1 if an individual did not vote for Unity and YUnity,i = 0 otherwise;
YOVR,i = 1 if an individual voted for OVR and YOVR,i = 0 otherwise. As in the previous section,
it is necessary to condition on covariates. We take the baseline covariates as in columns (1) and (2)
of table 6 and table 7 in EPZ. They include individual characteristics such as gender, age, marital
status, and education, and subregional variables such as population size and average wage.
FIGURE 2. Estimates of Marginal and Average Persuasion Rates
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Notes: The left and right panels of the figure show estimates of the marginal and average persua-
sion rates for not voting for Unity and voting for OVR, respectively.
For the sake of simplicity, we estimate θmte parametrically. The population conditional probabil-
ities, e(z, x), P(Yi = 1|e(Zi) = e, Xi = x) and P(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|e(Zi) = e, Xi = x), are estimated by
probit,13 and the conditional estimates of equation (11) are averaged out with respect to covariates
by sample survey weight.
Figure 2 presents the estimation results. In the left panel, θmte(v) and θ are plotted as a function
of v, when the outcome variable is to vote for Unity. It can be seen that the marginal persuasive rate
13The exposure rate e(z, x) is first estimated and its predicted values are included linearly as a regressor to estimate the
other two conditional probabilities.
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is about 90% at v = 0.1 but just 54% for v = 0.9. In view of equation (4), Vi can be interpreted as
the unobserved cost of watching NTV. The estimation results suggest that the persuasive effect for
not voting for Unity is much stronger for those whose unobserved cost of watching NTV is lower.
In the right panel, corresponding results are shown for OVR. In this case, the persuasive effect is
much weaker for those with lower values of v.
A striking patten we can learn from figure 2 is that persuasive effects are highly heterogenous.
This may partially answer the puzzle reported in EPZ. They found relatively modest positive per-
suasive effects for opposition parties but much stronger persuasive effects for Unity using ag-
gregate voting outcomes, while the magnitudes are similar using individual survey data.14 Our
estimation results indicate that the marginal persuasive effects are highly heterogenous, thereby
implying that different aggregate averages can be substantially different from each other. The aver-
age persuasive effect θ is plotted as a horizontal line in each panel of figure 2: it is 75.4% for Unity
and 20.8% for OVR. In short, this application exemplifies the identification power of continuous
instruments that can uncover the patterns of heterogeneity in persuasive effects.
7. EXAMPLES: DOOR-TO-DOOR FUNDRAISING
Landry, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (2006) and DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012) de-
signed field experiments of door–to–door fund raising to examine various aspects of charity giving.
In this section, we use their data to illustrate the usefulness of our identification results.
The common data structure in both papers is that for each type of experimental treatments, we
observe (Yi, Ti, Zi):
• Yi = 1 if a household made a contribution to door–to–door fund raising,
• Ti = 1 if a household answered the door and spoke to a solicitor,
• Zi = 1 if a household was approached by a solicitor.
If Zi = 0 (a household was not approached by a solicitor), then Ti = 0 and furthermore it is very
likely that Yi = 0. Hence, in this section, we assume that P(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|Zi = 0) = P(Yi = 1|Zi =
0) = 0. In addition, we assume that if Yi = 1, it must be the case that Ti = 1. In other words,
we assume that it is impossible to have both Yi = 1 and Ti = 0 (making a contribution without
answering the door). Thus, P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = 1) = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1). These assumptions were
also used in computation of the persuasion rates for donors in DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010).
14EPZ estimated the persuasion rate using a continuous version of DK. See equations (3) and (4) in EPZ for their formulae.
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Under these assumptions, we have the bound for θ as
θL = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) and θU = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) + 1− e(1).
In addition,
θlocal = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)/e(1);
θlocal is the same as the usual LATE.
7.1. Landry, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (2006) Revisited. In this study, there were four treat-
ments: VCM (voluntary contributions mechanism), VCM with seed money, single-prize lottery,
and multiple-prize lottery. Using Table II of Landry, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (2006), we com-
pute the persuasive effects by treatment and report results in table 7.
TABLE 7. Persuasive Effect by Treatment in Landry, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (2006)
Treatment P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) e(1) θL θU θlocal
VCM 9.5% 37.6% 9.5% 71.9% 25.3%
VCM with seed money 5.2% 35.3% 5.2% 69.9% 14.8%
Single-prize lottery 17.1% 37.7% 17.1% 79.4% 45.5%
Multiple-prize lottery 12.6% 35.2% 12.6% 77.5% 35.9%
All 10.8% 36.3% 10.8% 74.5% 29.7%
Based on the lower bound and the LATE parameter, it seems that the single–prize lottery is the
most effective fund raising tool, whereas the VCM with seed money is the least effective. However,
the identification regions for θ of all four treatments overlap and there is no clear ranking based on
those. This suggests that if one cares about the persuasive effect for the population, the evidence is
inconclusive.
7.2. DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2012) Revisited. In their study of charity giving, DellaVi-
gna, List, and Malmendier (2012, DLM hereafter) designed both fund raising and survey treatments
to test for altruism and social pressure in charity giving. In this section, we focus only on three fund
raising treatments: namely, the baseline treatment, the flyer treatment, and the opt-out treatment.
The baseline treatment is the standard door–to–door funding raising campaign, the flyer treatment
is with the flyer that provided information on fund raising the date before the solicitation, and the
opt–out treatment is with the flyer that had an additional feature of a “Do Not Disturb” checkbox.
There were two charities in each of the fund raising treatments: La Rabida Children’s Hospital and
the East Carolina Hazard Center.
24
Jun and Lee
TABLE 8. Persuasive Effect by Treatment in DLM
Treatment P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) e(1) θL θU θlocal
La Rabida Children’s Hospital
Baseline 7.1% 40.5% 7.1% 66.6% 17.5%
Flyer 6.8% 36.4% 6.8% 70.4% 18.8%
Opt–Out 5.4% 30.4% 5.4% 74.9% 17.7%
East Carolina Hazard Center
Baseline 4.7% 43.0% 4.7% 61.7% 10.9%
Flyer 5.1% 39.6% 5.1% 65.5% 12.9%
Opt–Out 3.0% 34.4% 3.0% 68.6% 8.6%
DLM pointed out that treatments were randomized within a date–solicitor time block and es-
timated linear probability models with covariates: solicitor fixed effects, date–town fixed effects,
hourly time block fixed effects, and area rating dummies. We use the same specification as in DLM,
estimate P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1, Xi = x) and e(1, x), and then average out the conditional estimates as in
section 6.2.15 The resulting estimates are reported in table 8, where we report the persuasive effect
by treatment/charity.
The local persuasion rate is point identified and is higher for the in–state charity, La Rabida
Children’s Hospital. The estimates of θlocal are the highest for the flyer treatment in both charities.
This does not mean that the flyer treatment is the most effective in fund raising for the general
population. Note that the compliers of the baseline treatment are different from those of the flyer
treatment. For example, it could be the case that households at the margin of giving might have
decided to not answer the door after they noticed the flyer. Unlike θlocal, θL and θU are comparable
across different treatments. However, as in the previous section, it is difficult to see whether there
is a significant difference across treatments if we focus on the bounds for θ.16
8. ESTIMATING THE LOWER BOUND AND THE LOCAL PERSUASION RATE
8.1. Efficient Estimation. In this section we consider semiparametrically efficient estimation of the
two key parameters, i.e. θL and θ∗.17 We will be explicit about the vector Xi of exogenous covariates.
15The data collected in DLM are available at http://eml.berkeley.edu/~sdellavi/index.html. As before, the predicted
probabilities are truncated to be between 0 and 1, when they are averaged out.
16In addition to the fund raising treatments, DLM relied on survey treatments and structural estimates to draw conclusions
in their paper.
17Efficient estimation of θ∗L or θUe is significantly more challenging because of the min function. It also requires a careful
construction of an estimator for the marginal persuasion rate. These are beyond the scope of the current paper but interesting
topics for future research.
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We focus on independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) data. For θL we work with the
dataset {(Yi, Zi, Xᵀi )ᵀ : i = 1, 2, · · · n}, whereas we use {(Yi, Ti, Zi, Xᵀi )ᵀ : i = 1, 2, · · · n} for θ∗.
Since we are now explicit about Xi, the objects of interest will be defined by integrating Xi out:
when we analyze the local persuasion rate, we will use the conditional distribution of Xi given the
group of compliers. Recall that θ˜L(x) is defined in (14). Let
θ˜∗(x) = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1, Xi = x)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x)
P(Yi = 0, Ti = 0|Zi = 0, Xi = x)−P(Yi = 0, Ti = 0|Zi = 1, Xi = x) ,
which correspond to the local persuasion rate conditional on Xi = x. Now, we average out Xi
with respect to an appropriate distribution to obtain the parameters we consider estimating in this
section: i.e.
θL =
∫
θ˜L(x)dF(x), (16)
θ∗ =
∫
θ˜∗(x)dF{x|e(0, Xi) < Vi ≤ e(1, Xi)}, (17)
where F(·) and F(·|·) denote the marginal and conditional distribution function of Xi, respectively,
and e(j, x) = P(Ti = 1|Zi = j, Xi = x) for j = 0, 1 is the exposure rate conditional on Xi = x: we
will let f (·) denote the density of Xi. By Bayes’ theorem θ∗ can be alternatively written as
θ∗ =
∫
θ˜∗(x){e(1, x)− e(0, x)} f (x)
P{e(0, Xi) < Vi ≤ e(1, Xi)} dx =
∫
θ˜∗(x){e(1, x)− e(0, x)} f (x)dx∫ {e(1, x)− e(0, x)} f (x)dx . (18)
Here, we emphasize that θ∗ is defined by averaging out Xi conditional on the event that individual
i is a complier—since the local persuasion rate is meaningful only for the group of compliers, it
would not make sense to average over the entire population.
Semiparametric estimation of θL and θ∗ is straightforward. Let
θˆL =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
ˆ˜θ(Xi) and θˆ∗ =
∑ni=1
ˆ˜θ(Xi){eˆ(1, Xi)− eˆ(0, Xi)}
∑ni=1{eˆ(1, Xi)− eˆ(0, Xi)}
, (19)
where eˆ(j, x) is a consistent estimator of e(j, x) for j = 0, 1, ˆ˜θL(x) and ˆ˜θ∗(x) are defined by replacing
all the probabilities in the definition of θ˜L(x) and θ˜∗(x) with their consistent estimators, respec-
tively.
Semiparametric estimators like the ones in equation (19) converge at the usual
√
n rate. Instead
of listing all regularity conditions, which are well understood in the literature (see, e.g. Newey,
1994; Ai and Chen, 2003; Chen, Linton, and Van Keilegom, 2003; Ai and Chen, 2012; Ackerberg,
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Chen, Hahn, and Liao, 2014), we will derive the pathwise derivatives of θL and θ∗. The theorem
stated below is the first main result of this section.
Theorem 7. Suppose that e(0, x) < e(1, x) with infx e(0, x) > 0 and supx e(1, x) < 1. Further, suppose
that infx P
{
Yi(0) = 0 | e(0, x) < Vi ≤ e(1, x), Xi = x
}
> 0. Then, the parameters θL and θ∗ in equa-
tions (16) and (17) are well defined and they are pathwise differentiable in the sense of Newey (1994). Also,
their (mean–zero) pathwise derivatives, denoted by FL(Y, Z, X) and F∗(Y, T, Z, X), respectively, depend
only on the objects that can be directly identified from data.
Theorem 7 does not display the specific forms of FL and F∗ simply because their expressions are
too long and distracting; they are provided in lemmas A.6 and A.8, respectively. Below we discuss
the relevance of theorem 7.
The pathwise differentiability can tell us a couple of things about the semiparametric estima-
tors θˆL and θˆ∗. First, FL(Yi, Zi, Xi) and F∗(Yi, Ti, Zi, Xi) will coincide with the influence functions
of the semiparametric estimators θˆL and θˆ∗ as long as they are asymptotically linear. Therefore,
the asymptotic variance of θˆL and θˆ∗ will be V
{
FL(Yi, Zi, Xi)
}
and V
{
F∗(Yi, Ti, Zi, Xi)
}
, respec-
tively. Further, we show in the appendix that FL and F∗ are contained in the appropriate tangent
space, which means that V
{
FL(Yi, Zi, Xi)
}
and V
{
F∗(Yi, Ti, Zi, Xi)
}
are in fact the semiparametric
efficiency bounds of θL and θ∗, respectively. We summarize these implications in the following
theorem.
Theorem 8. Suppose that θˆL and θˆ∗ are
√
n–consistent and asymptotically linear. Then, their asymptotic
variances are given by VL = E
{
F2L(Yi, Zi, Xi)
}
and V∗ = E
{
F∗2(Yi, Ti, Zi, Xi)
}
. Further, VL and V∗ are
the semiparametric efficiency bounds for estimating θL and θ∗, respectively.
By using the formulas of FL and F∗ provided in the appendix, we can consistently estimate VL
and V∗. Alternatively, one can simply rely on some resampling techniques such as the bootstrap.
Once we obtain the estimates VˆL and Vˆ∗ of the asymptotic variances, we can conduct inference on
θL and θ∗. In fact, inference on θL can be naturally extended to that of θ. Consider the simplest case
where there is no uncertainty in the upper bound: i.e. we only have data on (Yi, Zi, X
ᵀ
i )
ᵀ. In this
case, the sharp identified bounds of θ is simply [θL, 1], the asymptotically valid confidence interval
for θ with the shortest length will be
[
θˆL − z1−α ×
√
VˆL/n, 1
]
, where z1−α is the one–sided critical
value from the standard normal distribution (e.g. when α = 0.05, we have z1−α = 1.645). When we
observe all of (Yi, Ti, Zi, X
ᵀ
i )
ᵀ, θ∗ is point identified and therefore the shortest confidence interval of
θ∗ can be obtained by using the usual two–sided critical value as in θˆ∗ ± z1−α/2 ×
√
Vˆ∗/n.
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8.2. Revisiting the NTV Example. We revisit the NTV example in section 6.3 to illustrate the re-
sults of section 8.1. For simplicity, we focus on estimating the lower bound θL using a two–step
parametric approach. For this exercise, we first create a binary instrument
Zi = 1
{
Signal Poweri > median(Signal Power)
}
by using the original continuous instrument. The conditional lower bound θ˜L(x) is estimated using
probit models that are linear in covariates used in section 6.3 and is averaged out with respect
to covariates by sample survey weight. The standard error is obtained by replacing population
quantities of FL(Yi, Zi, Xi) in lemma A.6 with parametric estimates.
TABLE 9. Persuasion Rates: NTV Effects Using a Binary Instrument
(1) (2)
Not voting for Voting for
Unity OVR
Point estimate of the lower bound 0.191 0.056
Standard error of the lower bound 0.083 0.024
One-sided 95% confidence interval for θ [0.055,1] [0.016,1]
The estimation results are summarized in table 9. Both lower bounds are significantly different
from zero; however, they are far smaller than the estimates of θ based on the original continuous
instrument. This again illustrates the limitation of the identifying power of a binary instrument.
9. CONCLUSIONS
We have set up a simple econometric model of persuasion, have introduced several parameters
of interest, and have analyzed their identification. Our extensive empirical examples demonstrate
that the persuasive effects are highly heterogenous in both settings of media and fund raising. We
have focused on the case of binary treatments. In applications, treatments could be multivalued,
for example watching Fox News, CNN or MSNBC. It would be fruitful to build on recent develop-
ments in multiple treatments (e.g. Heckman and Pinto, 2018; Lee and Salanie´, 2018) to investigate
identification of persuasive effects. It would be also interesting to estimate deep parameters in
an economic model of persuasion using a more structural approach in the setup of multiple treat-
ments. These are topics of future research.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
A.1. Proof of lemma 1. If qi(0) ≤ qi(1), then Yi(0) = 1 and Yi(1) = 0 cannot happen. Now,
conversely, suppose that Yi(0) ≤ Yi(1). If P{qi(1) < qi(0)} > 0, then assumption A implies that
P{qi(1) < 1/(1 +Ui) < qi(0)} > 0. This contradicts P{Yi(0) ≤ Yi(1)} = 1. The denominator on
the right-hand side of equation (5) is nonzero since P{Yi(0) = 1} < 1 by assumption A. Finally,
equation (5) follows from the fact that Yi(1) − Yi(0) = 1{Yi(1) = 1, Yi(0) = 0} with probability
one. 2
A.2. Proof of theorem 1. By assumptions C and D,
P{Yi(z) = 1} = P(Yi(z) = 1|Zi = z) = P(Yi = 1|Ti = z) = P(Yi = 1|Zi = z). (20)
So, the assertion follows from lemma 1 and the definition of θL. 2
A.3. Under assumption E.
Lemma A.1. P{Yi(1) = 1 | e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)} is identified by
P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = 1)−P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = 0)
e(1)− e(0) .
Similarly, P{Yi(0) = 1 | e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)} is identified by
P(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|Zi = 0)−P(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|Zi = 1)
e(1)− e(0) .
Proof. The first assertion follows from
P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = z) = P{Yi(1) = 1, Vi ≤ e(z)}. (21)
The second statement is similar. 2
Lemma A.2. For z = 0, 1, P{Yi(1) = 1 | Vi ≤ e(z)} is identified by
P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = z)/e(z).
Similarly, P{Yi(0) = 1 | Vi > e(z)} is identified by
P(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|Zi = z)/{1− e(z)}.
Proof. The first assertion follows from
P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = z) = P{Yi(1) = 1, Vi ≤ e(z)}. (22)
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The second assertion is similar. 2
Lemma A.3. The sharp identified interval of P{Yi(1) = 1} is given by[
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1), P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = 1) + 1− e(1)
]
.
Similarly, the sharp identified interval of P{Yi(0) = 1} is given by[
P(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|Zi = 0), P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)
]
.
Proof. For the first assertion, note that
P{Yi(1) = 1} = P{Yi(1) = 1 | e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)}{e(1)− e(0)}
+P{Yi(1) = 1 | Vi ≤ e(0)}e(0) +P{Yi(1) = 1 | Vi > e(1)}{1− e(1)}. (23)
By lemmas A.1 and A.2, the first two terms on the right–hand side of equation (23) are identified
and their sum is equal to P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = 1). For the third term on the right–hand side of
equation (23), note that
P{Yi(1) = 1 | Vi > e(1)}{1− e(1)}
≥ P{Yi(0) = 1 | Vi > e(1)}{1− e(1)} = P(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|Zi = 1), (24)
where P{Yi(1) = 1 | Vi > e(1)} ≤ 1. Therefore, the sharp bounds of the third term on the right–
hand side of equation (23) is the interval betweenP(Yi = 1, Ti = 0|Zi = 1) and 1− e(1). Combining
all these proves the first assertion. The second assertion is similar. 2
Proof of Theorem 2: Let a = P{Yi(1) = 1} and b = P{Yi(0) = 1}: so, θ = (a− b)/(1− b). Let
ma, Ma be the lower and upper bounds of a provided in lemma A.3. Similarly, let mb, Mb be the
bounds of b given in lemma A.3. By lemma A.3 and the fact that the dependence between Yi(0)
and Yi(1) is unrestricted except that Yi(0) ≤ Yi(1), the identified bounds of θ can be obtained by
max
a,b
and min
a,b
a− b
1− b subject to a ∈ [ma, Ma], b ∈ [mb, Mb], a ≥ b. (25)
Here, note that Ma ≥ mb because e(0) < e(1) and Yi(0) ≤ Yi(1). Also, ma ≥ Mb because θ ≥ 0.
Therefore, the constraint a ≥ b is redundant. So, the minimum is θL = (ma −Mb)/(1−Mb) ≥ 0
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and the maximum is θU = (Ma −mb)/(1−mb): the monotonicity of the probability measure triv-
ially shows that θU ≤ 1. Finally, sharpness follows from the intermediate value theorem because
(a− b)/(1− b) varies continuously between θL and θU . 2
A.4. Under assumption F.
Lemma A.4. The sharp identified interval of P{Yi(1) = 1} is given by[
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1), min{1,P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) + 1− e(1)}
]
(26)
Similarly, the sharp identified interval of P{Yi(0) = 1} is given by[
max{0, P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)− e(0)}, P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)
]
. (27)
Proof. First, we focus on P{Yi(1) = 1}. Let C = min
[
P{Yi(0) = 1, Vi > e(1)}, P{Yi(1) = 0, Vi ≤
e(1)}]. Then, C ≥ 0. Further,
C +P(Yi = 1, Ti = 1|Zi = 1) = min{P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1), e(1)}. (28)
Therefore, by lemma A.3,
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) ≤ P{Yi(1) = 1} ≤ min{P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) + 1− e(1), 1} − C
≤ min{P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) + 1− e(1), 1},
where the last inequality follows from C ≥ 0. For sharpness, we only need to show that C can take
any value between 0 and min{1− e(1), 1−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)}. But this follows from the fact that
0 ≤ P{Yi(0) = 1, Vi > e(1)} ≤ P{Vi > e(1)} = 1− e(1),
0 ≤ P{Yi(1) = 0, Vi ≤ e(1)} = P{Yi = 0, Ti = 1|Zi = 1} ≤ P{Yi = 0|Zi = 1}.
For instance, if either P{Yi(0) = 1|Vi > e(1)} = 0 or P{Yi(1) = 0|Vi ≤ e(1)} = 0, then C = 0, and
if P{Yi(0) = 1|Vi > e(1)} = 1, then C = min{1− e(1), 1−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)}.18
The second assertion is similar. 2
Proof of theorem 3: Similarly to the proof of theorem 2, we need to consider
max
a,b
and min
a,b
a− b
1− b subject to a ∈ [ma, M˜a], b ∈ [m˜b, Mb], a ≥ b, (29)
where ma, M˜a, m˜b, Mb are given in lemma A.4. Follow the same reasoning as theorem 2. 2
18Note that P(Yi = 0|Zi = 1) = P{Yi(1) = 0, Vi ≤ e(1)}+ {1− e(1)}
[
1−P{Yi(0) = 1|Vi > e(1)}
]
.
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A.5. Under assumption G.
Proof of theorem 4: Since theorem 3 uses more information but its lower bound only depends on
the distribution of (Yi, Zi), it suffices to focus on the upper bound. From theorem 3, we can find the
sharp upper bound in this case by
max
0<e(0)≤e(1)<1
θUe =
min{1,P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) + 1− e(1)} −max{0, P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)− e(0)}
1−max{0, P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)− e(0)} .
(30)
Note that setting e(0) = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0) ≤ P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1) = e(1) yields the maximum value 1.
Sharpness follows from the fact that θUe is continuous in
(
e(0), e(1)
)
. 2
A.6. For the Compliers.
Proof of theorem 5: For part (i), note that
P(Yi = 1|Zi = z) = P{Yi(1) = 1, Vi ≤ e(z)}+P{Yi(0) = 0, Vi > e(z)},
from which it follows that
θlocal =
P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1)−P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0)
{e(1)− e(0)}P{Yi(0) = 0|e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)} . (31)
Finally, note that the denominator on the right–hand side of equation (31) is equal to
P{Yi(0) = 0, e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)} = P{Yi(0) = 0, e(0) < Vi} −P{Yi(0) = 0, e(1) < Vi},
where P{Yi(0) = 0, e(z) < Vi} = P{Yi = 0, Ti = 0|Zi = z}.
For part (ii), we look for sharp bounds for P{Yi(0) = 0, e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)} under assumption F.
Using the fact that the sharp bounds of P(A ∩ B ∩ C) when P(A ∩ B),P(B ∩ C), and P(C ∩ A) are
given are equal to the interval between 0 and min{P(A ∩ B),P(B ∩ C),P(C ∩ A)}, we know that
0 ≤ P{Yi(0) = 0, e(0) < Vi ≤ e(1)}
≤ min[P{Yi(0) = 0, Vi > e(0)}, e(1)− e(0), P{Yi(0) = 0, Vi ≤ e(1)}], (32)
where it suffices to look for the sharp upper bound of the expression on the utmost left–hand side.
First,
P{Yi(0) = 0, Vi > e(0)} = P(Yi = 0, Ti = 0|Zi = 0) ≤ P(Yi = 0|Zi = 0),
where the inequality holds with equality when P(Yi = 0, Ti = 1|Zi = 0) = 0. Second, note that
P{Yi(0) = 0, Vi ≤ e(1)} = P{Yi(0) = 0, Ti = 1|Zi = 1}
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is totally unidentified. So, we conclude that the sharp upper bound of the term on the right–hand
side of equation (32) is
min{P(Yi = 0|Zi = 0), e(1)− e(0)}. (33)
The bound in part (iii) corresponds to the case where e(1)− e(0) = 1. 2
Proof of theorem 6: By the same reasoning as lemma 1, we have
θmte(v) =
E{Yi(1)−Yi(0) |Vi = v}
P(Yi(0) = 0 | Vi = v} . (34)
Then as shown in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005),
E{Yi(1)−Yi(0) |Vi = v} = ∂P{Yi = 1|e(Zi) = e}∂e
∣∣∣∣
e=v
.
Also, by the same argument as in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005),
E{Yi(0) |Vi = v} = −∂P{Yi = 1, Ti = 0|e(Zi) = e}∂e
∣∣∣∣
e=v
.
The desired result follows immediately. 2
A.7. Efficient Estimation of θL.
In this part of the appendix we consider the efficiency issues for the θL parameter defined in equa-
tion (16). So, we assume that the data available to us are the i.i.d. observations of (Yi, Zi, X
ᵀ
i )
ᵀ.
Below we write f for F′, i.e. the density of Xi. Further, we use the following notation:
Py1|z1(x) = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 1, Xi = x) and Py0|z1(x) = 1−Py1|z1(x),
Py1|z0(x) = P(Yi = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x) and Py0|z0(x) = 1−Py1|z0(x),
Pz1(x) = P(Zi = z|Xi = x) and Pz0(x) = 1−Pz1(x).
Then, we can write the likelihood function as follows.
qL(y, z, x) = f (x) ∏
j∈{1,0}
[
Pzj(x)
{Py1|zj(x)yPy0|zj(x)1−y}]z˜j ,
where z˜1 = z and z˜0 = 1− z. Therefore, the loglikelihood function is given by
log qL(y, z, x) = log f (x) + ∑
j∈{1,0}
{
z˜j logPzj(x) + z˜jy logPy1|zj(x) + z˜j(1− y)Py0|zj(x)
}
. (35)
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Lemma A.5. The tangent space for θL is given by
TL =
{
α f (x) + {z−Pz1(x)}αz(x) + ∑
j∈{0,1}
z˜j{y−Py1|zj(x)}αy|zj(x)
}
,
where α f is any square–integrable function with E{α f (Xi)} = 0 and αz, αy|zj are any square–integrable
functions of x.
Proof. Let Pzj(x|γ),Pyk |zj(x|γ) denote regular parametric submodels indexed by γ:19 we will de-
note the true value by γ0. Then, it follows from equation (35) that the score is given by
s(y, z, x|γ0) = sX(x|γ0) + sZ|X(z, x|γ0) + sY|Z,X(y, z, x|γ0), (36)
where
sX(x|γ0) = 1f (x)
∂ f (x|γ)
∂γ
,
sZ|X(z, x|γ0) =
{ z
Pz1(x)
− 1− zPz0(x)
}∂Pz1(x|γ)
∂γ
,
sY|Z,X(y, z, x|γ0) = ∑
j∈{1,0}
z˜j
{ y
Py1|zj(x)
− 1− yPy0|zj(x)
}∂Py1|zj(x|γ)
∂γ
,
where all the derivatives are evaluated at γ0. The conclusion follows from the fact that all the
derivatives are unrestricted here. 2
Lemma A.6. The pathwise derivative of θL is given by
FL(Y, Z, X) =
Z
Pz1(X)
Y−Py1|z1(X)
1−Py1|z0(X)
+
1− Z
Pz0(X)
{
Y−Py1|z0(X)
}{
θ˜L(X)− 1
}
1−Py1|z0(X)
+ θ˜L(X)− θL.
Proof. Let θ¯L(γ) be the parameter corresponding to θL along regular parametric submodels indexed
by γ: i.e.
θ¯L(γ) =
∫ Py1|z1(x|γ)−Py1|z0(x|γ)
1−Py1|z0(x|γ)
f (x|γ)dx.
Then,
∂θ˜L(γ0)
∂γ
=
∫ 1
1−Py1|z0(x)
∂Py1|z1(x|γ)
∂γ
f (x)dx
+
∫
θL(x)− 1
1−Py1|z0(x)
∂Py1|z0(x|γ)
∂γ
f (x)dx +
∫
θL(x)
∂ f (x|γ)
∂γ
dx. (37)
19There is no loss of generality in assuming that γ is a scalar.
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Now, note that the score s(Y, Z, X|γ0) given in equation (36) is the sum of Bernoulli scores, and
therefore it follows that
∂θ¯L(γ0)
∂γ
= E
{
FL(Y, Z, X)s(Y, Z, X|γ0)
}
. 2
A.8. Efficient Estimation of θ∗. We now derive the efficient influence function of the integrated
local persuasion parameter defined in equation (17) when an i.i.d. sample of (Yi, Ti, Zi, Xi) is avail-
able. Similarly to the previous subsection we use the following notation:
Pz1(x) = P(Zi = 1|Xi = x) and Pz0 = 1−Pz1(x),
Pt1|z1(x) = P(Ti = 1|Zi = 1, Xi = x) and Pt0|z1(x) = 1−Pt1|z1(x),
Pt1|z0(x) = P(Ti = 1|Zi = 0, Xi = x) and Pt0|z0(x) = 1−Pt1|z0(x),
Py1|t1,z1(x) = P(Yi = 1|Ti = 1, Zi = 1, Xi = x) and Py0|t1,z1(x) = 1−Py1|t1,z1(x),
Py1|t0,z1(x) = P(Yi = 1|Ti = 0, Zi = 1, Xi = x) and Py0|t0,z1(x) = 1−Py1|t0,z1(x),
Py1|t1,z0(x) = P(Yi = 1|Ti = 1, Zi = 0, Xi = x) and Py0|t1,z0(x) = 1−Py1|t1,z0(x),
Py1|t0,z0(x) = P(Yi = 1|Ti = 0, Zi = 0, Xi = x) and Py0|t0,z0(x) = 1−Py1|t0,z0(x).
Using this notation, the likelihood function can be written as
q∗(y, t, z, x) = f (x) ∏
j={1,0}
[
Pzj(x) ∏
k={1,0}
{Ptk |zj(x) ∏
`={1,0}
Py` |tk ,zj(x)y˜`
}t˜k]z˜j
= f (x) ∏
j={1,0}
[
Pzj(x)z˜j ∏
k={1,0}
{Ptk |zj(x)t˜k z˜j ∏
`={1,0}
Py` |tk ,zj(x)y˜` t˜k z˜j
}]
, (38)
where z˜1 = z, z˜0 = 1− z, t˜1 = t, t˜0 = 1− t, and y˜1 = y, y˜0 = 1− y. Therefore, the loglikelihood
function is given by
log q∗(y, t, z, x) = log f (x) + ∑
j∈{1,0}
z˜j logPzj(x)
+ ∑
j∈{1,0}
∑
k∈{0,1}
t˜k z˜j logPtk |zj(x) + ∑
`∈{1,0}
∑
j∈{1,0}
∑
k∈{0,1}
y˜` t˜k z˜j logPy` |tk ,zj(x). (39)
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Lemma A.7. The tangent space for θ∗ is given by
T ∗ =
{
α f (x) + {z−Pz1(x)}αz(x) + ∑
j∈{0,1}
z˜j{t−Pt1|zj(x)}αt|zj(x)
+ ∑
j∈{0,1}
∑
k∈{0,1}
t˜k z˜j{y−Py1|tk ,zj(x)}αy|tkzj(x)
}
,
where α f is any square–integrable function with E{α f (X1)} = 0, and αz, αt|zj , αy|tk ,zj are any square–
integrable functions of x.
Proof. Let Pzj(x|γ),Ptk |zj(x|γ),Py` |tk ,zj(x|γ) denote regular parametric submodels indexed by γ:
as in the proof of lemma A.5, γ is a scalar–valued parameter and its true value is denoted by γ0.
From the loglikelihood function described in equation (39), we know that the score of the regular
parametric submodel can be written as follows:
s∗(y, t, z, x|γ0) = 1f (x)
∂ f (x|γ)
∂γ
+
{ z˜1
Pz1(x)
− z˜0Pz0(x)
}∂Pz1(x|γ)
∂γ
+ ∑
j∈{1,0}
z˜j
{ t˜1
Pt1|zj(x)
− t˜0Pt0|zj(x)
}∂Pt1|zj(x|γ)
∂γ
+ ∑
j∈{1,0}
∑
k∈{1,0}
t˜k z˜j
{ y˜1
Py1|tk ,zj(x)
− y˜0Py0|tk ,zj(x)
}∂Py1|tk ,zj(x|γ)
∂γ
, (40)
where all the derivatives are evaluated at γ0. Here, we can do further albegra by using
∂Pz1(x|γ)
∂γ
= −∂Pz0(x|γ)
∂γ
, (41)
∂Pt1|zj(x|γ)
∂γ
= −
∂Pt0|zj(x|γ)
∂γ
for j = 0, 1 (42)
∂Py1|tk ,zj(x|γ)
∂γ
= −
∂Py0|tk ,zj(x|γ)
∂γ
for j, k = 0, 1. (43)
Therefore, the score can be rewritten as follows:
s∗(y, t, z, x|γ0) = sX(x|γ0) + sZ|X(z, x|γ0) + sT|Z,X(t, z, x|γ0) + sY|T,Z,X(y, t, z, x|γ0), (44)
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where
sX(x|γ0) = 1f (x)
∂ f (x|γ)
∂γ
, (45)
sZ|X(z, x|γ0) =
z−Pz1(x)
Pz1(x)
{
1−Pz1(x)
} ∂Pz1(x|γ)
∂γ
, (46)
sT|Z,X(t, z, x|γ0) = ∑
j∈{1,0}
z˜j
{
t−Pt1|zj(x)
}
Pt1|zj(x)
{
1−Pt1|zj(x)
} ∂Pt1|zj(x|γ)
∂γ
, (47)
sY|T,Z,X(y, t, z, x|γ0) = ∑
j∈{1,0}
∑
k∈{1,0}
t˜k z˜j
{
y−Py1|tk ,zj(x)
}
Py1|tk ,zj(x)
{
1−Py1|tk ,zj(x)
} ∂Py1|tk ,zj(x|γ)
∂γ
. (48)
Interpretation of each term should be straightforward. For example, sT|Z,X(y, z, x|γ0) is the score of
T at t conditional on Z = z, X = x. Finally, the conclusion follows from equation (44) and the fact
that all the derivatives here are unrestricted. 2
Now, we derive the pathwise derivative of θ∗. For this purpose it is convenient to write
θ∗ =
∫
Q1(x)Q2(x) f (x)dx, (49)
where Q1(x) = Q1n(x)/Q1d(x) = θ∗(x) and Q2(x) = Q2n(x)/Q2d with
Q1n(x) = ∑
k∈{1,0}
Py1|tk ,z1(x)Ptk |z1(x)− ∑
k∈{1,0}
Py1|tk ,z0(x)Ptk |z0(x),
Q1d(x) = Py0|t0,z0(x)Pt0|z0(x)−Py0|t0,z1(x)Pt0|z1(x),
Q2n(x) = Pt1|z1(x)−Pt1|z0(x),
Q2d =
∫ {Pt1|z1(x)−Pt1|z0(x)} f (x)dx.
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Further, we define the following functions:
F∗1 (Y, T, Z, X) =
TZ
Pt1|z1(X)Pz1(X)
{
Y−Py1|t1,z1(X)
} Q2(X)
Q1d(X)
Pt1|z1(X),
F∗2 (Y, T, Z, X) =
(1− T)Z
Pt0|z1(X)Pz1(X)
{
Y−Py1|t0,z1(X)
} Q2(X)
Q1d(X)
{
1−Q1(X)
}Pt0|z1(X),
F∗3 (Y, T, Z, X) = −
T(1− Z)
Pt1|z0(X)Pz0(X)
{
Y−Py1|t1,z0(X)
} Q2(X)
Q1d(X)
Pt1|z0(X),
F∗4 (Y, T, Z, X) = −
(1− T)(1− Z)
Pt0|z0(X)Pz0(X)
{
Y−Py1|t0,z0(X)
} Q2(X)
Q1d(X)
{
1−Q1(X)
}Pt0|z0(X),
F∗5 (Y, T, Z, X) =
Z
{
T −Pt1|z1(X)
}
Pz1(X)
(
Q2(X)
Q1d(X)
[
Py1|t1,z1(X)−
{
1−Q1(X)
}Py1|t0,z1(X)−Q1(X)]+ Q1(X)Q2d − S2
)
,
F∗6 (Y, T, Z, X) = −
(1− Z){T −Pt1|z0(X)}
Pz0(X)
×
(
Q2(X)
Q1d(X)
[
Py1|t1,z0(X)−
{
1−Q1(X)
}Py1|t0,z0(X)−Q1(X)]− Q1(X)Q2d + S2
)
,
F∗7 (Y, T, Z, X) = Q1(X)Q2(X)− S2
{
Pt1|z1(X)−Pt1|z0(X)−Q2d
}
− θ∗,
where S2 =
∫
Q1(x)Q2(x) f (x)dx/Q2d.
Lemma A.8. The pathwise derivative of θ∗ is given by the function F∗ defined by F∗(Y, T, Z, X) =
∑7j=1 F
∗
j (Y, T, Z, X).
Proof. Let θ¯∗(γ) be the parameter corresponding to θ∗ along regular parametric submodels indexed
by γ: i.e.
θ¯∗(γ) =
∫
Q1(x|γ)Q2(x|γ) f (x|γ)dx,
where Q1(x|γ), Q2(x|γ), and f (x|γ) are naturally defined from Q1, Q2, and f , respectively.
We now calculate the derivatives of the Q functions with respect to γ (evaluated at γ0). For this
calculation there are only seven relevant derivatives, i.e.
∂Py1|t1,z1(x|γ)
∂γ
,
∂Py1|t0,z1(x|γ)
∂γ
,
∂Py1|t1,z0(x|γ)
∂γ
,
∂Py1|t0,z0(x|γ)
∂γ
,
∂Pt1|z1(x|γ)
∂γ
,
∂Pt1|z0(x|γ)
∂γ
,
∂ f (x|γ)
∂γ
.
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Consider the easy ones first:
∂Q2n(x|γ)
∂γ
=
∂Pt1|z1(x|γ)
∂γ
− ∂Pt1|z0(x|γ)
∂γ
,
∂Q2d(γ)
∂γ
=
∫ {∂Pt1|z1(x|γ)
∂γ
− ∂Pt1|z0(x|γ)
∂γ
}
f (x)dx +
∫ {Pt1|z1(x)−Pt1|z0(x)}∂ f (x|γ)∂γ dx.
Now, here are the messier ones:
∂Q1n(x|γ)
∂γ
= ∑
k∈{1,0}
∂Py1|tk ,z1(x|γ)
∂γ
Ptk |z1(x) +
{
Py1|t1,z1(x)−Py1|t0,z1(x)
}∂Pt1|z1(x|γ)
∂γ
− ∑
k∈{1,0}
∂Py1|tk ,z0(x|γ)
∂γ
Ptk |z0(x)−
{
Py1|t1,z0(x)−Py1|t0,z0(x)
}∂Pt1|z0(x|γ)
∂γ
,
∂Q1d(x|γ)
∂γ
=
∂Py1|t0,z1(x|γ)
∂γ
Pt0|z1(x)−
∂Py1|t0,z0(x|γ)
∂γ
Pt0|z0(x)
+ Py0|t0,z1
∂Pt1|z1(x|γ)
∂γ
−Py0|t0,z0
∂Pt1|z0(x|γ)
∂γ
.
Now, note that ∂θ∗(γ)/∂γ is the sum of the following terms:∫
∂Q1(x|γ)
∂γ
Q2(x) f (x)dx =
∫ Q2(x)
Q1d(x)
A1(x|γ) f (x)dx (50)∫
Q1(x)
∂Q2(x|γ)
∂γ
f (x)dx =
∫ Q1(x)
Q2d
A2(x|γ) f (x)dx (51)∫
Q1(x)Q2(x)
∂ f (x|γ)
∂γ
dx, (52)
where
A1(x|γ) = ∂Q1n(x|γ)∂γ −Q1(x)
∂Q1d(x|γ)
∂γ
and A2(x|γ) = ∂Q2n(x|γ)
∂γ
−Q2(x)∂Q2d(γ)
∂γ
.
Again, consider the easy one first:
A2(x|γ) = A21(x|γ) + A22(x|γ) + A23(x|γ), (53)
where
A21(x|γ) =
∂Pt1|z1(x|γ)
∂γ
−Q2(x)
∫ ∂Pt1|z1(r|γ)
∂γ
f (r)dr
A22(x|γ) = −
∂Pt1|z0(x|γ)
∂γ
+ Q2(x)
∫ ∂Pt1|z0(r|γ)
∂γ
f (r)dr,
A23(x|γ) = −Q2(x)
∫ {
Pt1|z1(r)−Pt1|z0(r)
}∂ f (r|γ)
∂γ
dr.
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Here, note that∫ Q1(x)
Q2d
A21(x|γ) f (x)dx =
∫ {Q1(x)
Q2d
− S2
}
f (x)
∂Pt1|z1(x|γ)
∂γ
dx, (54)
∫ Q1(x)
Q2d
A22(x|γ) f (x)dx = −
∫ {Q1(x)
Q2d
− S2
}
f (x)
∂Pt1|z0(x|γ)
∂γ
dx, (55)∫ Q1(x)
Q2d
A23(x|γ) f (x)dx = −S2
∫ {
Pt1|z1(x)−Pt1|z0(x)
}∂ f (x|γ)
∂γ
dx. (56)
Next, here are the messier one:
A1(x|γ) = A11(x|γ) + A12(x|γ) + A13(x|γ) + A14(x|γ) + A15(x|γ) + A16(x|γ), (57)
where
A11(x|γ) = Pt1|z1(x)
∂Py1|t1,z1(x|γ)
∂γ
, (58)
A12(x|γ) =
{
1−Q1(x)
}Pt0|z1(x)∂Py1|t0,z1(x|γ)∂γ , (59)
A13(x|γ) = −Pt1|z0(x)
∂Py1|t1,z0(x|γ)
∂γ
, (60)
A14(x|γ) = −
{
1−Q1(x)
}Pt0|z0(x)∂Py1|t0,z0(x|γ)∂γ , (61)
A15(x|γ) =
[
Py1|t1,z1(x)−
{
1−Q1(x)
}Py1|t0,z1(x)−Q1(x)]∂Pt1|z1(x|γ)∂γ , (62)
A16(x|γ) = −
[
Py1|t1,z0(x)−
{
1−Q1(x)
}Py1|t0,z0(x)−Q1(x)]∂Pt1|z0(x|γ)∂γ . (63)
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Therefore, combining equations (50) to (52), (54) to (56) and (58) to (63), we conclude that ∂θ∗(γ)/∂γ
is the sum of the following terms:
∫ Q2(x)
Q1d(x)
Pt1|z1(x) f (x)
∂Py1|t1,z1(x|γ)
∂γ
dx,
∫ Q2(x)
Q1d(x)
{
1−Q1(x)
}Pt0|z1(x) f (x)∂Py1|t0,z1(x|γ)∂γ dx,
−
∫ Q2(x)
Q1d(x)
Pt1|z0(x) f (x)
∂Py1|t1,z0(x|γ)
∂γ
dx,
−
∫ Q2(x)
Q1d(x)
{
1−Q1(x)
}Pt0|z0(x) f (x)∂Py1|t0,z0(x|γ)∂γ dx,∫ ( Q2(x)
Q1d(x)
[
Py1|t1,z1(x)−
{
1−Q1(x)
}Py1|t0,z1(x)−Q1(x)]+ Q1(x)Q2d − S2
)
f (x)
∂Pt1|z1(x|γ)
∂γ
dx,
−
∫ ( Q2(x)
Q1d(x)
[
Py1|t1,z0(x)−
{
1−Q1(x)
}Py1|t0,z0(x)−Q1(x)]− Q1(x)Q2d + S2
)
f (x)
∂Pt1|z0(x|γ)
∂γ
dx,
∫ [
Q1(x)Qx(x)− S2
{Pt1|z1(x)−Pt1|z0(x)}]∂ f (x|γ)∂γ dx.
Finally, we note that the function F∗ satisfies that
∂θ∗(γ)
∂γ
= E
{
F(Y, T, Z, X)s∗(Y, T, Z, X|γ0)
}
,
where s∗ is defined in equation (44): in fact, this equation can be seen immediately from the fact
that s∗ is the sum of Bernoulli scores.20 2
Proof of Theorem 7 It directly follows from lemmas A.6 and A.8. 2
Proof of Theorem 8 It follows from Theorem 2.1 in Newey (1994) and the fact that the scores given
in equations (36) and (40) can approximate any mean zero random variable with an arbitrarily
small mean squared error. 2
20To see this point, it is helpful to consider a simple binary example. For instance, consider a generic binary variable B
such that P(B = 1|X,γ) = pB(X|γ). Suppose that the parameter β satisfies ∂β(γ)/∂ =
∫
A(x)∂pB(X|γ)/∂γ f (x)dx =
E{A(X)∂pB(X|γ)/∂γ}. Here, the score of B given X is
sB(B|X) = B− pB(X)pB(X){1− pB(X)}
∂pB(X|γ)
∂γ
.
Now, we are looking for the function G∗(B, X) such that
E{G∗(B, X)sB(B|X)} = E
{
A(X)
∂pB(X|γ)
∂γ
}
,
where
E{G∗(B, X)sB(B|X)} = E
[{
G∗(1, X)− G∗(0, X)} ∂pB(X|γ)
∂γ
]
.
Therefore, we immediately see that G∗(B, X) = {B− pB(X)}A(X) does the job.
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